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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature Of The Case 
This appeal raises questions of law related to application of the Idaho Telephone 
Solicitation Act to claims by an unregistered telephone solicitor, Appellee Drug Testing 
Compliance Group, LLC ("DTC Group") against its competitor, Appellant DOT Compliance 
Service ("DOT Compliance"). DTC Group obtained a verdict at trial based on allegations that 
DOT Compliance informed DTC Group customers of their statutory right to cancel purchases 
under the Idaho Telephone Solicitation Act and encouraged them to do so. The jury's verdict 
must be set aside because (1) DTC Group did not present evidence of intentional interference 
that caused a breach of any contract because, under the Idaho Telephone Solicitation Act, 
customers have a statutory right to cancel purchases within three days; and (2) DTC Group's 
failure to register as a telephone solicitor renders its contracts "null and void" as a matter of law. 
DTC Group also claims that DOT Compliance breached a contract by disparaging DTC 
Group in violation of a non-disparagement provision in a Settlement Agreement. The jury found 
no damages for breach of contract. However, the jury awarded damages against DOT 
Compliance's owners, Jeff Minert and David Minert, for breach of the implied covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing for reporting DTC Group's illegal price-fixing proposal to federal law 
enforcement officers, which resulted in an FBI investigation. That verdict must be set aside 
because (1) DTC Group concedes that it did not present any evidence that Jeff Minert or David 
Minert disparaged DTC Group in violation of the Settlement Agreement; (2) any call to the FBI 
does not violate the Settlement Agreement and, in fact, occurred prior to execution of the 
Settlement Agreement; and (3) DTC Group failed to present any evidence of damages. 
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Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings 
1. Defendant/Appellant DOT Compliance 
DOT Compliance provides drug and alcohol testing programs and other services that help 
transportation companies comply with Department of Transportation licensing requirements and 
reporting regulations. See Reporter's Transcript ("Tr."), 436:9-25. DOT Compliance was 
established in March of 2011 and, during the relevant time frame, was owned and managed by 
Jeff Minert and David Minert. Id. at 431 :21 - 433:4-22. The Minert also own a related drug 
testing company, which has been in the drug testing business for 25 years. Id. 
DOT Compliance markets its services through telephone solicitations to newly registered 
trucking companies. Id. at 433: 1 436:25. Each day, the names and contact information of 
approximately 400 newly registered owners/operators are made publicly available. Id. DOT 
Compliance calls those newly registered trucking companies and offers to sell them services 
related to drug testing, driver qualification files and related compliance services required by 
Department of Transportation regulations and licensing requirements. Id. 
There are only a couple other companies that offer services in competition with DOT 
Compliance. Id. at 440:24 - 441: 14. In addition to providing what it believes is the best service 
in the industry, DOT Compliance sells its services for a lower price than its competitors. Id. at 
499: 1-4; 584:23 - 585: 1. DOT Compliance's business model is to compete on service and price, 
and it openly tells potential customers that its prices are lower than its competitors' prices. Id. 
2. Plaintiff/ Appellee DTC Group 
DTC Group is owned by David Crossett. Id. at 443:20-24. Crossett learned about DOT 
Compliance's business plan from a friend who worked as a janitor in DOT Compliance's office 
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building and had access to DOT Compliance's business records. ld. at 272: 17 - 274:23. Crossett 
offered the janitor an ownership interest in DTC Group in exchange for information about DOT 
Compliance's business. ld. DTC Group then approached two DOT Compliance employees and 
offered them jobs. Id. at 275:7 - 276:11; 277:19- 279:12. The employees informed DTC Group 
that they had signed non-compete agreements. Id. DTC Group had legal counsel review the 
non-compete agreements and hired the employees anyway because "after speaking to legal, we 
were willing to challenge it." ld. at 279: 13-17. 
3. The }~irst Litigation 
DOT Compliance filed suit against DTC Group and Crossett on July 12, 2013 (the "First 
Litigation"). See Trial Exh. 500. DOT Compliance's complaint included claims for tortious 
interference with contract related to the hiring of individuals who had signed non-compete 
agreements with DOT Compliance. Id. DTC Group and Crossett asserted counterclaims for 
slander and tortious interference with contracts, similar to the claims in this appeal. Id. 
4. DTC Group's Price-Fixing Proposal and the Federal Investigation 
In June of 2014, Crossett called David Minert and proposed that DOT Compliance and 
DTC Group agree not to compete against each other so they could each raise their prices. Tr., 
480: 18 - 482:21. David Minert contacted an attorney to look into what he believed was an illegal 
price fixing scheme. Id. at 483:15 484:6. Two days later, the Department of Justice, Antitrust 
Division, contacted DOT Compliance and asked it to assist in an investigation. Id. at 484:7 -
485:7. The Department of Justice provided the Minerts with a wire and two monitoring devices 
and asked the Minerts to set up a meeting with Crossett and ask him to explain his proposal. Id. 
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at 485:8-25. The Minerts did as the Department of Justice requested and set up a meeting with 
Crossett on July 10, 2014. Id. at 486: 1 - 487:23. 
In that meeting, Crossett proposed a "first call wins" agreement under which each 
company would agree not to compete for the other's customers so each party could freely raise 
its prices. Id. Crossett stated he was going to raise DTC Group's prices that weekend, which 
would allow DOT Compliance to raise its prices to the same level. Id. at 487:24 - 489:16. DTC 
Group did, in fact, raise its prices shortly after the proposal. Id. at 300: 18-1; 495 :23 - 496:4. 
5. The Settlement Agreement 
On July 11, 2014, DTC Group and Crossett entered into a Settlement Agreement (the 
"Settlement Agreement") with DOT Compliance, David Minert and Jeff Minert. See Trial Exh. 
500. The Settlement Agreement contained a mutual release of all claims pertaining to "any 
activities or conduct occuffing before the Effective Date of this Agreement, including, but not 
limited to ... interference with prospective economic relations or advantages, ... for breach of 
the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, for slander, libel or defamation." Id. 
The Settlement Agreement contained a "No Disparagement" provision as follows: 
(a) The Parties will not disparage each other in their 
communications with third parties relating to the character, 
reputation, profession, business, practices, operations, services, 
facilities, presence, plans, or conduct of another Party, and shall 
not cause, encourage or suggest disparaging statements to be made 
by a third party regarding a Party. Id. 
6. The Idaho Telephone Solicitation Act 
a) The Statutory Three-Day Cancellation Period 
The Idaho Telephone Solicitation Act (LC.§ 48-1001 et seq.) applies to all telephone 
solicitors making telephone solicitations to or from locations within Idaho. See LC. § 48-
APPELLANT'S BRIEF-4 
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1002(2). The Idaho Telephone Solicitation Act requires telephone solicitors to give purchasers 
an unqualified right to cancel a purchase within three days "without any penalty or obligation 
whatsoever." LC. § 48-1004. To ensure that all purchasers are fully aware of this right, the 
statute requires that telephone solicitors (1) orally inform purchasers of the cancellation right at 
the time of purchase and (2) send written notification of the cancellation right following sale. Id. 
DTC Group acknowledges that it is subject to the Idaho Telephone Solicitation Act and, 
therefore, is statutorily required to give all purchasers an unqualified right to cancel within three 
days of purchase. Id. at 312:2 - 313:4; 338: 17 - 339:23. DTC Group claims that it orally informs 
purchasers of their cancellation right at the time of sale. Id. at 605:9-19. However, when 
customers attempt to cancel they are often told they cannot cancel. Id. at 312:8 - 316:4. 
DOT Compliance sometimes calls companies that have just recently been contacted by 
one of its competitors. DOT Compliance salespeople tell those customers that (1) the customer 
has a statutory right to cancel its purchase within three days and (2) DOT Compliance offers the 
same or better services for a lower price. Tr., 502:5 - 503:5; 587:2-19. 
b) DTC Group's l1'ailure to Register as a Telephone Solicitor 
The Idaho Telephone Solicitation Act mandates that all telephone solicitors "[r]egister 
with the attorney general at least ten (10) days prior to conducting business in Idaho." LC. § 48-
1004. DOT Compliance is registered with the Idaho Attorney General. Tr., 574:12-17. DTC 
Group is not registered with the Idaho Attorney General, even though it acknowledges that it is 
required to do so by the Idaho Telephone Solicitation Act. Id. at 603: 17 - 605:22. 
The registration process requires that telephone solicitors submit an application, along 
with proof that its website contains a written three-day cancellation policy consistent with the 
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Idaho Telephone Solicitation Act. Id. DTC Group attempted to register with the Idaho Attorney 
General's Office shortly before trial, but its application was denied because DTC Group's 
website does not include a sufficiently clear three-day cancellation policy. Id. 
The consequence of violatin2. the Idaho Telenhone Solicitation Act. inclu<lirn:r failure to 
.,I, .._,, i. 7 LJ 
register with the attorney general, is that contracts resulting from telephone solicitations arc "null 
and void." See LC. § 48-1007 ("If a telephone solicitor violates any applicable provision of this 
chapter, any contract of sale or purchase is null and void and unenforceable."). 
7. Procedural Posture 
a) The Complaint 
On August 18, 2014, DTC Group filed a Complaint against DOT Compliance, Jeff 
Minert and Ryan Bunnell (a DOT Compliance salesperson). R., 000014-27. A subsequent 
Amended Complaint adds David Minert as a Defendant. R., 000229-243. The Amended 
Complaint asserts claims for (1) breach of contract; (2) breach of the covenant of good faith and 
fair dealing; (3) tortious interference with contracts; (4) tortious interference with prospective 
economic advantage; (5) unfair competition; and (6) civil conspiracy. Id. 
b) Trial 
DTC Group's trial theme was that DOT Compliance attempted to "put [DTC Group] out 
of business." Id. at 118:3-5; 112: 19-22. In its opening statement, DTC Group told the jury that 
DOT Compliance reported DTC Group to law enforcement agencies in furtherance of its goal to 
put DTC Group out of business. Id. at 117: 16-21. 
Crossett testified about the late-June of 2014 conversation with the Minerts in which they 
discussed their competing businesses. Id. at 177:20 - 183:6. According to Crossett, he made 
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only an "off-hand comment that I'd been wanting to raise my prices for a long time." Id. at 
183:21-23. However, Crossett insists that he did not propose any price-fixing. Id. at 359:20-21. 
Crossett then met again with the Minerts on July 10, 2014 -- the day before signing the 
Settlement Agreement. Id. at 185: 18 - 186:4. Unbeknownst to Crossett, that conversation was 
recorded at the urging of federal law enforcement officers. Id. at 485:8-25. 
In describing his conversations with the Minerts, Crossett testified that he did not ever 
suggest any price-fixing. In fact, Crossett testified that the Minerts were the ones who proposed 
the price-fixing scheme. Id. at 186:24 - 189:9. Consistent with DTC Group's trial theme, 
Crossett then asserted that the call to the FBI was "frivolous" and part of a larger plan to put 
DTC Group out of business. Id. at 359:10-21. 
Crossett's testimony DOT Compliance's call to the FBI was "frivolous" is demonstrably 
false because the FBI recorded the July 10th meeting on video. After Crossett testified falsely 
that it was the Mincrts who proposed to fix prices, DOT Compliance subpoenaed the video 
recording from the FBI and called an FBI agent to authenticate the video at trial. Tr., 466:20 -
475:6. The purpose of introducing the FBI's video recording was to impeach Crossett's 
testimony in which he asserted that DOT Compliance proposed a price-fixing scheme and then 
frivolously reported DTC Group to the FBI in an attempt to put it out of business. 
The District Court did not allow DOT Compliance to call the FBI witness or play the 
video for the jury. Tr., 466:20 - 473:25. In excluding that evidence, the District Court ruled that 
it was "impeachment on a collateral issue." Id. at 471 :23-25. Part of the District Court's 
rationale for excluding the impeachment evidence was that DTC Group was not permitted to 
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claim damages as a result of the FBI investigation. Id. at 471:7-8 ("Well, he's not claiming 
damages for that l the report to the FBI] either"). 
Crossett attempted to testify as to the "damages" DTC Group suffered as a result of the 
FBI investigation, including the time, resources and attorney fees it spent in connection with the 
investigation. Id. at 191 :4 - 192:14. DOT Compliance objected to that testimony on grounds 
that DTC Group had not disclosed that claim for damages in its Complaint or in discovery. Id.; 
id. at 206: 19 - 214: 17. The District Court sustained that objection and did not allow Crossett to 
testify as to damages allegedly sustained as a result of the FBI investigation. Id. at 214:17. 
Even though the District Court precluded DTC Group from presenting damages related to 
the FBI investigation, DTC Group's counsel again emphasized the call to the FBI in her closing 
arguments. 739: 19 - 740:5. Counsel referenced the order excluding damages related to that call, 
but asked the jury to consider the excluded damages in calculating damages for lost customers: 
And, remember, although -- remember I told you about there was 
these non-monetary or damages that David couldn't really 
quantify. Those things being like ... administrative time, time to 
respond to the FBI investigation, things of that nature that we're 
not going to be able to recoup because we lost that third bucket. 
But just keep in mind that those damages were there for David. 
And he endured all this at the same time that he was trying to run 
his business. Id. 
c) Motion for Directed Verdict 
DOT Compliance moved for directed verdict at the conclusion of DTC Group's case in 
chief and again at the conclusion of trial. Tr., 415: 15 - 429:3; 651 :6 - 655:4. The motions 
sought dismissal of DTC Group's tortious interference with contract claims because (1) DTC 
Group failed to present evidence that any Defendant caused customers to breach a contract in 
light of the statutory three-day cancellation period; and (2) DTC Group's contracts were "null 
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and void" as a matter of statutory law for failure to register as a telephone solicitor with the 
Idaho Attorney General's Office. Id. The District Court denied the motions. Id. 
At the conclusion of trial, the District Court dismissed DTC' s Groups claims for civil 
conspiracy and tortious interference with prospective economic advantage for lack of evidence. 
Tr. 643:14- 644:13; 687:22- 688:5. The tortious interference with contract claim against David 
Minert and Jeff Minert were also dismissed because of a lack of evidence that either of them 
made disparaging comments to DTC Group customers. Tr., 699:14 - 700:8. The District Court 
did not dismiss the tortious interference with contract claim against DOT Compliance and Ryan 
Brunell, the salesman who allegedly made disparaging comments to DTC Group customers. Id. 
The District Court had dismissed the unfair competition claim before trial. Id. at 75:8-12. 
d) Jury Instructions 
The District Court instructed the jury on the remaining claims: (1) breach of contract 
against DOT Compliance, David Minert and Jeff Minert; (2) breach of the implied covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing against DOT Compliance, David Minert and Jeff Minert; and (3) 
tortious interference with contract against DOT Compliance and Ryan Brunnell. R., 000329-
334. 
DOT Compliance attempted to call Brett Delange, the Deputy Attorney General who 
enforces the Idaho Telephone Solicitation Act, as a witness at trial. Tr., 457:8 - 466: 18. Mr. 
Delange was expected to testify that he sent an enforcement letter to DTC Group explaining that 
DTC Group is subject to the Idaho Telephone Solicitation Act and that, under the statute, 
customers have a three-day right of cancellation. Tr., 458:23 - 459: 1; 461: 19 - 462:6. 
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The District Court excluded Mr. Delange from testifying on grounds that it was the 
District Court's job to instruct the jury on the law. Id. at 459: 13-16. The District Court indicated 
that it would instruct the jury on the Idaho Telephone Solicitation Act, including its provision 
that customers have an unconditional right to cancel within three days: 
As I said, if you want an instruction that the law says that, under 
the law, a telephone customer is entitled to cancel without penalty -
- or however you want to phrase it -- within three days of entering 
in the transaction, I'd be happy to consider it and probably would 
give the jury such an instruction. Id. at 464:5-16. 
DOT Compliance submitted proposed jury instructions that min-ored the relevant 
provisions of the Idaho Telephone Solicitation Act. R., 000287-295. Despite its prior statement 
that it would probably instruct the jury on the Idaho Telephone Solicitation Act, the District 
Court refused to issue DOT Compliance's proposed instructions or any instructions whatsoever 
explaining the Idaho Telephone Solicitation Act. Tr., 64 7 :4-13. 
With regard to jury instructions on the claim for tortious interference with contract, the 
District Court declined to issue the standard jury instruction approved by the Idaho Civil Jury 
Instructions Committee, IDJI 4.70, which requires proof that "[t]he defendant intentionally 
interfered with the contract, causing a breach." R., 000266; Tr., 658:22 - 660:12. Over DOT 
Compliance's objection, the District Court modified the jury instruction to state that DTC Group 
need only prove that a defendant "intentionally interfered with the contract, causing a breach m: 
termination." R., 000318 ( emphasis added). 
e) The Verdict 
The jury returned special verdict forms on each of DTC Group's remaining claims. The 
jury returned a "zero" verdict on the breach of contract claim. R., 000329-30. Although the jury 
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found that DOT Compliance, David Minert and Jeff Minert breached the Settlement Agreement, 
it determined that DTC Group did not prove any damages as a result of the breach. Id. 
With regard to the claim for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, the 
jury determined that DOT Compliance, Jeff Minert, and David Minert breached the covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing. R., 000334-335. The jury again determined that DTC Group did not 
prove any damages caused by DOT Compliance. Id. The jury did award $20,000 in damages 
against Jeff Minert and David Minert, individually. Id. 
Finally, the jury returned a verdict in favor of DTC Group on its claim for tortious 
interference with contract and awarded $500 in damages against Ryan Bunnell and $20,000 in 
damages against DOT Compliance. R., 000331-32. 
f) JNOV Motion 
DOT Compliance moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict ("JNOV") on grounds 
that no evidence was presented at trial that David Minert or Jeff Minert personally engaged in 
conduct that violated the Settlement Agreement as required to establishing such a claim. R. 
000430-442. The District Court denied that motion in an oral ruling from the bench. Tr., 806-
826. In doing so, the District Court concluded that the jury's verdict against Jeff Minert and 
David Minert for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing was supported by 
the fact that they rep011ed DTC Group to the FTC -- even though the District Court had expressly 
excluded damages for that call and even though the call to the FBI occurred prior to execution of 
the Settlement Agreement. Id. at 817 :9 - 818: 17 ("And I think in this case the jury could infer 
that the Minerts and thereafter their company were responsible for the calls to the Department of 
Finance, the calls to the FBI ... and that was the basis for their finding of liability."). 
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The fact that the jury's implied covenant verdict was based on the call to the FBI is 
further made clear by the jury's special verdict forms. DTC Group played recorded 
conversations at trial that it claimed contained disparaging comments made by DOT Compliance 
employees (e.g., Ryan Bunnell), but DTC Group has conceded that no evidence was presented at 
trial of disparaging comments made by Jeff Minert or David Minert. Tr., 344: 13 - 345: 1; R., 
000530 (conceding that "DTC Group had no phone recordings in which Dave Minert or Jeff 
Minert actually defamed DTC Group to a customer"). The jury's verdicts found that DOT 
Compliance breached the Settlement Agreement and violated the covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing. R., 000329-330; 000333-334. However the jury returned "zero" verdicts against DOT 
Compliance because DTC Group did not prove any damages caused by DOT Compliance. Id. 
Thus, the award of damages against Jeff Minert and David Minert was based on something other 
than the allegedly disparaging comments made to DTC Group customers -- the call to the FBI. 
g) Award of Attorney Fees 
DTC Group moved for an award of attorney fees based on Idaho Code§ 12-120(3) and 
the terms of the Settlement Agreement, which provides for an award of fees to the prevailing 
pmty in an action based on a breach of the Settlement Agreement. R., 000335-371. DOT 
Compliance, David Minert and Jeff Minert also moved for attorney fees because they prevailed 
on the breach of contract claim. R., 000376-429. 
DOT Compliance objected to DTC Group's fee request because (I) DTC Group did not 
prevail on the breach of contract claim -- the only claim arising out of a commercial transaction; 
and (2) DTC Group's fee request did not apportion its fees between claims that did and did not 
arise out of a commercial transaction. Tr., 789:25 790:7; 792: 15-20. The District Court 
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awarded DTC Group the entirety of its attorney fees and declined to apportion fees between the 
claims that did and did not arise out of a commercial transaction. Id. at 824:10 - 826:10. 
On August 3, 2015, the District Court entered Final Judgment against DOT Compliance 
in the amount of $20,000; Jeff Mine1t in the amount of $20,000; David Minert in the amount of 
$20,000; and Ryan Bunnell in the amount of $500. R., 000559-560. The District Court also 
entered judgment against DOT Compliance, Jeff Minert and David Minert, jointly and severally, 
for fees and costs in the amount of $87,414.14. Id. 
8. The FTC Complaint and the Consent Agreement 
At trial, Crossett testified that the FBI "closed" its investigation and that "no wrongdoing 
was found." Tr., 351: 11-14. That testimony was part of DTC Group's trial theme that DOT 
Compliance violated the covenant of good faith and fair dealing by making a "frivolous" repo1t 
to the FBI. Id. at 359: 17-21. After trial, the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") issued a formal 
complaint against DTC Group ("FTC Complaint"). The FTC Complaint alleges as follows: 
DTC Group and Competitor A market and sell similar services in 
direct competition. Beginning in 2013 and continuing to date, 
DTC Group and Competitor A have competed for one another's 
customers by offering lower prices for similar services .... 
On or about July 10, 2014, Mr. Crossett met with the principals of 
Competitor A. Mr. Crossett proposed that the firms agree not to 
solicit or compete for one another's customers. Specifically, Mr. 
Crossett proposed that DTC Group and Competitor A should 
reciprocally agree to refrain from selling or attempting to sell a 
service to a customer if the rival firm had previously arranged to 
sell the same service to the customer. Mr. Crossett referred to this 
arrangement as "First Call Wins," and explained that such 
agreement would allow each company to sell its services to 
customers without fearing that its rival would later undercut it with 
a lower price. 
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The FTC Complaint alleges that DTC's Group's actions "constitute unfair methods of 
competition in or affecting commerce in violation of Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission 
Act, as amended." 
In an FTC Public Notice published December 18, 2015 in the Federal Register/ Vol. 80, 
No 243, the FTC explained that "Mr. Crossett's communication to Competitor A is an attempt to 
arrange a customer allocation agreement between the two companies" that, "if accepted, would 
be a per se violation of the Sherman Act." The FTC Public Notice further advises the public that 
DTC Group has agreed to a Consent Agreement and a Consent Order mandated that, for a period 
of four years, DTC Group provide a copy of the FTC Complaint and Order to every person who 
becomes an employee or officer of DTC Group and to periodically submit compliance reports to 
the FTC. As explained in the FTC's published notice, the proposed Consent Agreement is 
subject to a 30 day public comment period expiring January 13, 2016, after which the proposed 
Consent Agreement will become final. I 
(1) 
1 
II. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
Whether the District Court erred in denying the motion for directed verdict on DTC 
Group's claim for tortious interference with contract 
Each of the documents referenced in this section are official public documents available on 
the FTC' s website at https ://www.ftc.gov/ enforcement/ cases-proceedings/ 151-0048/ drug-
tes ting-comp liance-group-llc-matter and referenced in the FTC notice published in the 
Federal Register. Pursuant to I.R.E. 201, this Court may take judicial notice of these FTC 
proceedings. See Trautman v. Hill, 116 Idaho 337,340 (Ct. App. 1989) (judicial notice "may 
be taken at any stage in the proceeding, at the trial or appellate level and extends to official 
reports of the federal government. ... "); United States v. Merck-Medco Managed Care, 
L.L.C., 336 F. Supp. 2d 430,446 (E.D. Pa. 2004) (taking judicial notice of an FTC complaint 
and an FTC press release regarding an antitrust settlement between a party and the FTC). 
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Whether the District Court erred in denying the JNOV motion on DTC Group's claim for 
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing 
(3) Whether the District Court erred by failing to instruct the jury on the Idaho Telephone 
Solicitation Act and by misstating the law on tortious interference with contracts 
(4) Whether the District Court erred in excluding the FBI recording 
(5) Whether the District Court erred in awarding DTC Group attorney fees and denying 
Appellants' motion for attorney fees 
(6) Whether Appellants are entitled to an award of attorney fees on appeal 
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
"In determining whether a district court should have granted a IJNOV] motion, this Court 
employs the same standard the district court used in ruling on the motion." High Valley 
Concrete, L.L.C. v. Sargent, 149 Idaho 423,427 (2010). A JNOV motion should be denied only 
"if there is evidence of sufficient quantity and probative value that reasonable minds could have 
reached a similar conclusion to that of the jury." Id. Thus, a verdict should be set aside if it is 
not "supported by substantial and competent evidence." Id. Similarly, the Court "exercises free 
review" when reviewing the denial of a directed verdict to determine "whether there was 
sufficient evidence to justify submitting the claim to the jury, viewing as true all adverse 
evidence and drawing every legitimate inference in favor of the party opposing the motion for a 
directed verdict." Enriquez v. Idaho Power Co., 152 Idaho 562, 565 (2012). 
"The correctness of jury instructions is a question of law over which this Court exercises 
free review, and the standard of review of whether a jury instruction should or should not have 
been given, is whether there is evidence at trial to support the instruction." Smith v. Mitton, 140 
Idaho 893, 899 (2004). The standard of review is "whether the instructions, as a whole, fairly 
and adequately present the issues and state the law." Id. 
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IV. ARGUMENT 
A. The District Court Failed to Apply the Idaho Telephone Solicitation Act 
The most significant error at the trial court level was in the District Court's failure to 
apply the Idaho Telephone Solicitation Act. The Idaho Telephone Solicitation Act contains two 
requirements that directly impact OTC Group's claims. First, it mandates that all individuals 
who purchase a product or service from a telephone solicitor be given an unqualified right to 
cancel the purchase within three days, "without any penalty or obligation whatsoever." LC. 
§ 48-1004. Second, it requires all telephone solicitors to "lr]egister with the attorney general at 
least ten (10) days prior to conducting business in Idaho." LC. § 48-1004. Application of either 
of these provisions requires setting aside the jury's verdict for tortious interference with contract. 
Pursuant to I.AR. 35(f), copies of the relevant statutes are included in an addendum to this brief. 
1. DTC Group Did Not Establish a Claim for Tortious Interference with 
Contract Because DTC Group's Customers had a Statutory Right to Cancel 
within Three Days 
a) The District Court Erred in Denying DOT Compliance's Motion for 
Directed Verdict on the Tortious Interference Claim 
The Idaho Telephone Solicitation Act mandates that all individuals who purchase a 
product or service as a result of a telephone solicitation be given an unqualified right to cancel 
the purchase within three days, "without any penalty or obligation whatsoever." LC. § 48-1004. 
Telephone solicitors are required to "[ o ]rally inform the purchaser at the time the purchase is 
completed of his right to cancel." Id. at § 48-1004( d). The Idaho Telephone Solicitation Act 
further requires that the telephone solicitor send a written notice to purchasers as follows: 
NOTICE OF CANCELLATION 
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You may cancel this transaction, without any penalty or obligation 
whatsoever, within three business days of the date in which you 
receive this written confirmation. 
If you cancel, all payments or other consideration which may have 
already been made by you will be returned within ten business 
days following receipt by the telephone solicitor of your 
cancellation notice. 
Id. at § 48-1004(2). DTC Group acknowledged at trial that, as an Idaho telephone solicitor, it is 
required to give purchasers this unqualified right to cancel within three days. Tr., 312:2- 313:4. 
The District Courted erred by failing to apply this provision of law to DTC Group's 
tortious interference claim. To establish a claim for tortious interference with contract, a plaintiff 
must prove four elements: "(1) the existence of a contract; (2) knowledge of the contract on the 
part of the defendant; (3) intentional interference causing a breach of the contract; and ( 4) 
injury to the plaintiff resulting from the breach." Bybee v. Isaac, 145 Idaho 251, 259 (2008). 
DTC Group's tortious interference claim was based solely on evidence that DOT 
Compliance Group advised DTC Group customers of their statutory three-day right to cancel and 
encouraged them to do so. 2 As a matter of law, that conduct cannot support a tortious 
interference claim because it did not and could not "caus[e] a breach of the contract," -- an 
essential element of a tortious interference claim. Id. In fact, DTC Group conceded at trial that 
no breach of contract occurs when a customer cancels within three days after their purchase: 
2 
Q ..... And so if a customer -- if any of these customers called you 
within three days after they purchased and wanted to cancel, that 
customer has not violated their -- or breached their contract with 
you, right? 
No evidence was presented that DOT compliance encouraged DTC Group customers to 
cancel outside of the statutory three-day cancellation period or to otherwise breach a contract. 
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A. Correct 
Tr., 338:22 339:23. 
DTC Group did not present evidence to establish an essential element of its intentional 
inference claim -- "intentional interference causin2 a breach of the contract." Bybee, 145 
Idaho at 259. Accordingly, the District Court erred in denying the motion for directed verdict on 
DTC Group's tortious interference claim and the jury's verdict must be set aside. 
b) The Tortious Interference Jury Instruction Misstated the Law 
The District Court compounded its error with a jury instruction that misstates the law. 
DOT Compliance asked the Court to issue the standard jury instruction (IDJI 4.70) approved by 
the Idaho Civil Jury Instructions Committee. R., 000266. The standard jury instruction mirrors 
the elements of a tortious interference claim as set forth in Bybee v. Isaac, as follows: 
With respect to the plaintiff's claim for tortious interference with 
contract, the plaintiff has the burden of proving each of the 
following propositions: 
( 1) The plaintiff was a party to an existing contract; 
(2) The defendant knew of the contract; 
(3) The defendant intentionally interfered with the contract, 
causing a breach; 
(4) The plaintiff was damaged as a proximate result of the 
defendant's interference; and 
(5) The nature and extent of damage, and the amount thereof. 
See IDJI 4.70 (emphasis added). 
Over DOT Compliance's objection, the District Court modified IDJI 4.70 such that it 
would allow the jury to return a verdict for tortious interference with contract even without a 
showing that the defendant caused a breach of a contract. Tr., 658:22 - 660: 12. Specifically, the 
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District Court modified subsection (3) of IDJI 4.70 to instruct the jury that DTC Group was 
required to prove only that "(3) The defendant intentionally interfered with the contract, causing 
a breach or termination." 000318 ( emphasis added). 
In modifying this instruction, the District Comi relied on Wesco Autobody Supply, Inc. v. 
Ernest, 149 Idaho 881(2010). Tr., 658:22 - 660:] 2. However, Wesco does not stand for the 
proposition that merely influencing a third party to terminate a contractual relationship, absent a 
breach of a contract, is sufficient to support a claim for tortious interference with contract. In 
fact, Wesco reached the opposite conclusion. In that case, Wesco, an auto body supply store, 
asserted claims against its competitor, Paint and Spray Supply, Inc. ("P & E") for hiring Wesco's 
at-will employees and influencing customers to do business with P & E instead of Wesco. 
In analyzing the tortious interference with contract claim arising out of P & E's hiring of 
Wesco's at-will employees, the Court stated in passing that "[l]iability may arise for tortious 
interference with a contract even where the contract is terminable at will." Id. at 895 ( citing the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 766 cmt. g. (1979)).3 Nevertheless, this Court explained that 
tortious interference with contract still requires four elements, including "intentional interference 
3 Comment g to the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 766 notes that interference with a 
contract terminable at will is more analogous to a claim for tortious interference with 
prospective economic advantage, which requires an additional showing that the interference 
was "wrongful" or "improper." The Comment further explains that interference by a 
competitor with a contract terminable at will is generally not wrongful. Id. (citing 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 768, Comment i). In turn, Comment i to Section 768 
explains that, when a customer terminates a contract that is "terminable at will," there is no 
breach of the contract. Id. "The competitor is therefore free, for his own competitive 
advantage, to obtain the future benefits for himself by causing the termination." Id. "Thus 
he may offer better contract terms, as by offering [a better price], and he may make use of 
persuasion or other suitable means, all without liability." Id. 
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causing a breach of the contract." Id. ( emphasis added). This Court then affirmed the district 
court's entry of summary judgment because, although P & E influenced the employees to 
terminate their at-will employment contracts with Wesco, there was "no evidence in the record to 
suggest that Wesco employees breached their employment contract with Wesco and, therefore, 
Wesco cannot maintain this action against Defendants") (emphasis added). 
This Court also affirmed summary judgment on Wesco's tortious interference claim 
arising out of the fact that P & E influenced Wesco customers to stop purchasing paint from 
Wesco and to start purchasing paint from P & E. The customers had contracts with Wesco, but 
the contracts did not obligate the customers to continue purchasing goods and/or services from 
Wesco. Id. Thus, although P & E influenced Wesco's customers to stop purchasing goods and 
services from Wesco and start purchasing similar goods and services from P & E, Wesco did not 
have a claim for tortious interference with contract because P & E did not cause the customers to 
breach any contract. Id. (dismissing claim because there was "no other evidence that such 
Wesco customers then breached such a contractual duty as a result of any interference in the 
contractual relationship by any of the Defendants") (emphasis added). 
The same analysis applies here. Even if DOT Compliance influenced customers to 
terminate a contractual relationship with OTC Group, there simply is no claim for tortious 
interference with contract because there is no evidence that DOT Compliance caused customers 
to breach a contract. To the contrary, OTC Group has conceded that no breach of contract 
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occurs when a customer cancels within three days after their purchase because the Idaho 
Telephone Solicitation Act expressly gives customers that right. Tr., 338:22 - 339:23.4 
The District Court's misstatement of the law in its jury instruction constitutes reversible 
error. Fowler v. Kootenai Cty., 128 Idaho 740, 745 (1996) (a district court's jury instruction that 
contains a "misstatement of the law which may have had a prejudicial or misleading effect on the 
jury" constitutes reversible error). 
Finally, it must be noted that the District Court's misstatement of the law and failure to 
apply the Idaho Telephone Solicitation Act, has a stifling effect on competition. As the United 
States Supreme Court as recognized, "competition in respect to price" is "the central nervous 
system of the economy." Cal(fornia Dental Ass'n v. F. T. C., 526 U.S. 756, 784-85 (1999). 
"Among the central facets of this system is competition on the basis of price -- a recognition that 
suppliers can, and often do, offer lower prices to induce buyers to purchase their goods or 
services rather than those of a competitor." United States v. Am. Exp. Co., 88 F. Supp. 3d 143, 
4 This principle is perhaps most recognizably demonstrated by T-Mobile, which directs it 
advertising to other can-iers' customers in industry standard two-year contracts that allow for 
cancellation upon payment of early termination fees. T-Mobile openly and aggressively 
advertises that it will pay "early termination fees for customers who switched from another 
provider to T-Mobile." See In the Matter of Implementation of Section 6002(b) of the 
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Annual Report and Analysis of Competitive 
Market Conditions With Respect to Mobile Wireless, Including Commercial Mobile 
Services, 29 F.C.C. Red. 15311 (2014), 2014 WL 7339736. Ironically, DTC Group took 
advantage of this same principle when it hired DOT Compliance's employees to enable it to 
start its business. Crossett admitted that he knew the employees had signed employment 
contracts with covenants not to compete. Tr., 275:7 - 276: 11. However, based on advice 
from his lawyer that the contracts were not enforceable, he decided to hire the employees 
anyway. Id. at 279:13-17 ("after speaking to legal, we were willing to challenge it"). Thus, 
Crossett acknowledged at trial that there is no legal remedy for encouraging a third party to 
terminate a contract so long as termination does not result in a breach. 
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208-09 (E.D.N.Y. 2015). So long as it does not induce customers to breach a contract, DOT 
Compliance is free to compete on price and inform customers of their cancellation rights under 
the Idaho Telephone Solicitation Act. Indeed, one of the stated legislative purposes of the Idaho 
Telephone Solicitation Act is to "foster and encourage competition and fair dealings among 
telephone solicitors." Id. at§ 48-1001(2). 
2. DTC Group Cannot Establish a Claim for Tortious Interference with 
Contract Because DTC Group's Contracts Were Void Ab lnitio, as a Matter 
of Law, for Failure to Register as a Telephone Solicitor 
The Idaho Telephone Solicitation Act mandates that all telephone solicitors "[r]egister 
with the attorney general at least ten (10) days prior to conducting business in Idaho." I.C. § 48-
1004. DTC Group is not registered with the attorney general, even though it acknowledges that 
the Idaho Telephone Solicitation Act requires it to do so. Tr., 603: 17 - 605:22. 
The Idaho Legislature is very serious about compliance with the Idaho Telephone 
Solicitation Act, such that "f a]ny violations of the provisions of [ the act J" constitutes "an 
unlawful, unfair, and deceptive act or practice in trade or commerce .... " LC. § 48-1003(2). "If a 
telephone solicitor violates any applicable provision of this chapter, any contract of sale or 
purchase is null and void and unenforceable." LC. § 48-1007. Given that DTC Group violated 
the Idaho Telephone Solicitation Act by failing to register as a telephone solicitor, its contracts 
with customers are "null and void." As a matter of law, a customer's termination of a "void" 
contract cannot serve as the basis of a claim for tortious interference with contract. See Silicon 
Int'/ Ore, LLC v. Monsanto Co., 155 Idaho 538,551 (2013) ("a claim for tortious interference 
with a contract .... is available when a contract is voidable or unenforceable but is not available 
when the contract is void ab initio."). 
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DOT Compliance raised this issue in a pre-trial summary judgment motion and as part of 
a motion for directed verdict. R., 000093-106; Tr., 651:7 - 655:4. In denying those motions, the 
District Court found that DOT Compliance lacks "standing" to raise the unenforceability of DTC 
Group's contracts. fd. at 72:5-16; 654: 12-15. Specifically, the District Court stated that the 
Idaho Telephone Solicitation Act is "not self-executing" and that "the defendants do not have 
standing to challenge these contracts or to have them declared void." Id. In other words, the 
District Court concluded that a contract entered into in violation of the Idaho Telephone 
communications Act is merely "voidable" at the urging of the purchaser and not "void." 
The District Court's analysis was simply wrong. This Court has drawn a bright-line 
distinction between contracts that are merely "voidable" at the urging of one party and contracts 
that are "void." Contracts that are merely "voidable" may serve as the basis of a claim for 
tortious interference with contract, but "void" contracts cannot as a matter of law. Barlow v. 
International Harvester Co., 95 Idaho 881, 893, 11. 2 (1974) ("Protection is extended against 
unjustifiable interference with contracts even though the contract is voidable .... The rule is 
otherwise with regard to contracts void ab initio."); Silicon Int'l Ore. 155 Idaho at 551 ("This 
Court has held that a claim for tortious interference with a contract is available when a contract is 
voidable or unenforceable but is not available when the contract is void ab initio."). 
"Contracts that are void ab initio are deemed never to have existed in the eyes of the law 
and cannot form the basis for a tortious interference action." AMX Int'/, Inc. v. Battelle Energy 
Alliance, LLC, 744 F. Supp. 2d 1087, 1093 (D. Idaho 2010). "The threshold issue in this case, 
then, is whether !the underlying contract with which the defendant allegedly interfered] is void 
ab initio or simply voidable." Id. ( entering judgment as a matter of law in favor of the defendant 
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because the non-compete agreement with which it allegedly interfered violated the law and was, 
therefor, "void" and not merely "voidable"). 
OTC Group's contracts are not just "voidable" at the urging of a customer. Instead, the 
applicable provision of this chapter, any contract of sale or purchase is null and void and 
unenforceable." I.C. § 48-1007 (emphasis added). The Idaho Legislature understands the 
difference between "void" and "voidable" contracts. State v. Oar, 129 Idaho 337, 340 (1996) 
("when the legislature ... bmTows terms of art in which are accumulated the legal tradition and 
meaning of centuries of practice, it presumably knows and adopts the cluster of ideas that were 
attached to each borrowed word in the body of learning from which it was taken and the meaning 
its use will convey to the judicial mind unless otherwise instructed"). 
Indeed, the Idaho Telephone Solicitation Act is consistent with other Idaho statutes 
providing that contracts entered into in violation of the statutes are "void," often in the case of 
statutes requiring registration. See, e.g., I.C. §§ 49-1601, 49-1632 (requiring licensing of motor 
vehicle dealers and providing that "I a ]ny provision of any agreement. .. which is in violation of 
any section of this chapter shall be considered null and void and without force and effect."); I.C. 
§ 54-4804 (requiring registration of athlete agents and providing that "[a]n agency contract 
resulting from conduct in violation of this section is void .... ). These statutes can be easily 
contrasted with other Idaho statutes providing that contracts entered into in violation of statutes 
are merely "voidable." See, e.g., I.C. § 55-1819 (regulating the sale or disposition of land 
located outside the states and providing that a disposition "made in violation of any of the 
provisions of this chapter. .. shall be voidable at the election of the purchaser). 
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In summary, given the undisputed fact that DTC Group is not a registered telephone 
solicitor as required by the Idaho Telephone Solicitation Act, its purported contracts with 
customers are "null and void" as a matter of law. Under well-established Idaho law, interference 
with a "void" contract cannot support a claim for tortious interference with contract. 
Accordingly, the District Court erred in denying DOT Compliance's motion for directed verdict 
on DTC Group's claims for tortious interference with Contract. 
3. The District Court Erred In Refusing to Instruct the Jury on the Idaho 
Telephone Solicitation Act 
DOT Compliance attempted to call Brett Delange, the Deputy Attorney General with 
responsibility for enforcing the Idaho Telephone Solicitation Act, to testify that he sent an 
enforcement letter to DTC Group explaining that DTC Group is subject to the Idaho Telephone 
Solicitation Act and that, under that statute, customers have a three-day right of cancellation. 
Tr., 457:8 - 462:6. The District Court excluded Mr. Delange from testifying on grounds that it 
was the duty of the District Court, not an expert witness, to instruct the jury on the law. Id. The 
District Court indicated that it would instruct the jury on the Idaho Telephone Solicitation Act, 
and in particular its provision that customers have a statutory right to cancel within three days: 
Tr., 468:5-16. 
As I said, if you want an instruction that the law says that, under 
the law, a telephone customer is entitled to cancel without penalty -
or however you want to phrase it - within three days of entering in 
the transaction, I'd be happy to consider it and probably would 
give the jury such an instruction. 
DOT Compliance proposed jury instructions that mirrored the Idaho Telephone 
Solicitation Act. R., 000287-295. Those proposed jury instructions expiained the iegai concepts 
described above. For example, DOT Compliance proposed jury instructions explaining that: 
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• "The Idaho Telephone Solicitation Act requires every telephone solicitor to 
register with the Idaho Attorney General at least ten days before conducting 
business." (mirroring LC.§ 48-I004(a)). R., 000291. 
• "If a telephone solicitor violates any provision of the Idaho Telephone Solicitation 
Act, any contract of sale or purchase is null and void and unenforceable." 
(mi1rnring LC. § 48-1007(2)). R., 000295. 
• "Unless a telephone solicitor gives the purchaser an unqualified right to return the 
goods or cancel the services and receive a full refund, a telephone solicitor must 
send a statement, in writing, to the purchaser, stating that they may cancel the 
transaction, without penalty, within three business days of the date in which the 
purchaser receives the written confirmation. Telephone solicitors are also 
required to orally inform the purchaser at the time the purchase is completed of 
the customer's right to cancel." (mirroring LC.§ 48-I004(d); I004(f)(2)). R. 
000294. 
Despite its prior indication that it would instruct the jury on the Idaho Telephone 
Solicitation Act, the District Court refused to issue DOT Compliance's proposed instructions or 
any instructions whatsoever explaining the Idaho Telephone Solicitation Act. Tr., 647:4-13. 
The standard of review with regard to jury instructions is "whether the instructions, as a 
whole, fairly and adequately present the issues and state the law." Smith v. Mitton, 140 Idaho 
893, 899 (2004). Here the jury was not instructed on the state of the law, including that (I) 
customers have a statutory right to cancel within three days of a purchase; and (2) a contract 
entered into by an unregistered telephone solicitor is "null and void." Not knowing the law on 
these issues allowed the jury to issue a verdict for tortious interference with contract even though 
(1) customer cancellations within three days do not constitute a breach of contract; and (2) as a 
matter of law, there was no contract to be breached. Accordingly, the District Court's failure to 
instruct the jury on the Idaho Telephone Solicitation Act constitutes reversible error. 
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The District Court Erred in Denying the JNOV l\1otion on DTC Group's Claims for 
Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing 
The jury returned a verdict of $20,000 against both David Minert and Jeff Minert, 
individually, for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. R, 000333-334. 
The implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing "requires the parties to perform, in good 
faith, the obligations required by their agreement." Silicon Int'/ Ore, 155 Idaho at 552. Conduct 
that "violates, nullifies or significantly impairs any benefit of the ... contract is a violation of the 
implied-in-law covenant." Idaho First Nat. Bank v. Bliss Valley Foods, Inc., 121 Idaho 266, 288 
(1991 ). Importantly, the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing "does not create 
independent obligations, it merely applies to contractual obligations." Id. Thus, the implied 
covenant "only arises in connection with the terms agreed to by the parties, and docs not create 
new duties that are not inherent in the !contract]." Van v. PortneufMed. Ctr., 147 Idaho 552, 
562 (2009). Given that the implied covenant imposes only obligations "consistent with the 
express terms of an agreement between contracting parties," it does not impose terms not 
addressed by a contract. Bank of Commerce v. Jefferson Enterprises, LLC, 154 Idaho 824,831 
(2013); see also Wesco, 149 Idaho at 891-92 (2010) (there can be no implied covenant claim 
based on solicitation of customers where the contract did not contain a provision prohibiting 
solicitation); Wooden v. First Sec. Bank of Idaho, 121 Idaho 98, 101 (1991) ("there is no basis 
for Wooden's claim that the agreement imposed on the bank an implied covenant to protect 
Wooden's property from liens" because the contract contained no such obligation). 
The only contract between the parties is the Settlement Agreement. Tr., 306:3-7. DTC 
Group's Amended Compiaint aUeges that DOT Compliance, Jeff Minert and David Minert 
violated the covenant of good faith and fair dealing by disparaging DTC Group to its customers 
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in violation of the non-disparagement provision of the Settlement Agreement. R., 000235. 
Specifically, the Amended Complaint alleges that Defendants (1) contractually agreed in the 
Settlement Agreement that they "would not disparage DTC in communications with third 
parties"; (2) did "not act in good faith with respect to their agreement to not disparage DTC as 
specified in the Settlement Agreement"; (3) "impaired DTC's rights under the non-
disparagement provision contained in that agreement"; and (4) caused DTC Group damages in 
the form of cancelled contracts. Id. 
The District Court's jury instructions mirrored DTC Group's pleading: 
INSTRUCTION NO. 17 
With respect to plaintiff's claim for breach of the implied covenant 
of good faith and fair dealing, the plaintiff has the burden of 
proving .... 
1. that plaintiff and the defendant entered into a contract; 
2. that the defendant unfairly disparaged plaintiff to others so 
as to nullify or impair the benefits of the plaintiff under the 
contract; 
3. that plaintiff is not attempting to create obligations that are new 
or inconsistent with the contract; and 
4. that plaintiff has been damaged by the defendant's conduct; and 
5. the amount of the damages. 
R., 000316 (emphasis added). 
"[T]he sufficiency of the evidence to support a verdict must be based upon the jury 
instructions. Masell Equities, LLC v. Berryhill & Co., 154 Idaho 269,275 (2013). "Whether the 
evidence was sufficient to support the verdict will therefore depend upon the law as set forth in 
the jury instructions." Id. The jury verdict must be set aside because there is simply no evidence 
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in the record that Jeff Minert or David Minert "unfairly disparaged plaintiff to others so as to 
nullify or impair the benefits of the plaintiff under the contract." 
DTC Group presented some limited evidence at trial that other DOT Compliance 
employees (i.e., Ryan Bunnell, but not Jeff or David Minert) made statements to customers that 
OTC Group characterizes as disparaging and in violation of the non-disparagement provision in 
the Settlement Agreement.5 However, DTC Group presented no evidence that Jeff Minert or 
David Minert personally disparaged DTC Group or otherwise violated, nullified or significantly 
impaired the non-disparagement provision in the Settlement Agreement. Indeed, OTC Group 
conceded at trial that it has no evidence that Jeff Minert or David Mine1t made disparaging 
comments about OTC Group. As to Jeff Minert, Crossett testified: 
Q. Okay. And can you identify any calls for me that Mr. Jeff 
Minert made that inte1fered with your customer contracts? 
A. Calls? I cannot make those, no. 
Q. Okay. And can you identify for me anything that he did 
specifically -- I want specific instances of when he breached that 
non-disparagement clause, Section 4 of that settlement agreement? 
A. He specifically as an individual and not as the business owner? 
Q. Yes, please. 
A. As an individual I don't know that. [sic] I have that evidence. 
Tr., 344:13 - 345:1; see also R., 000530 (conceding that "OTC Group had no phone recordings 
in which Dave Minert or Jeff Minert actually defamed OTC Group to a customer"). 
5 The jury returned a zero verdict against DOT Compliance on the claims for breach of 
contract and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing -- meaning it found 
no damages as a result of any such breach. R., 000334. 
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At trial, Crossett was asked to identify what specific actions Jeff Minert and David 
Minert took that supported DTC Group's claims against them personally. Tr., 343:15 - 351:21. 
Crossett identified three actions, none of which involve disparagement or any other violation of 
the Settlement Agreement: 
First, he asserted that Jeff Minert and David Minert acted in bad faith by suing DTC 
Group three days after it went into business. Id. at 346:7 - 347:7. Of course, that lawsuit was 
filed a year before the Settlement Agreement was executed. See Triai Exh. 500. Such pre-
contract conduct cannot serve as a basis for a breach of the Settlement Agreement or a breach of 
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. See Profl Serv. Indus., Inc. v. Kimbrell, 834 
F. Supp. 1305, 1310 (D. Kan. 1993) ("allegations pertaining to conduct occuning prior to the 
formation of the contract cannot be actionable" because "the implied covenant of good faith and 
fair dealing applies to the pe,formance of a contract, not to its formation") ( emphasis in 
original); Silicon Int'/ Ore, 155 Idaho at 552 ("the covenant only requires that the parties perform 
in good faith the obligations imposed by their agreement. ... Thus, before a party can breach this 
covenant there must be a contract."). Moreover, the Settlement Agreement contains a broad 
mutual release of all claims pertaining to "any activities or conduct occurring before the 
Effective Date of this Agreement, including, but not limited to ... breach of the covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing, for slander, libel or defamation." Trial Exh. 500. As a result, any claims 
arising out of conduct prior to the Settlement Agreement have been released. 
Second, although admitting he had no evidence to support his assertions, Crossett 
asserted that Jeff and/or David Minert contacted the Department of Labor, triggering an audit of 
DTC Group. Tr., 347:8-19. Id. Any alleged contact with the Department of Labor occmTed 
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prior to the Settlement Agreement, and therefore cannot support a claim that the Minerts 
breached the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Tr., 210:10-19; 160:20- 163:5 (testifying 
that the Department of Labor audit occurred shortly after depositions in the First Litigation). 
Third, Crossett asserted that Jeff and David Minert contacted the FBI, which resulted in a 
price-fixing investigation. Tr., 344:4-12. More specifically, DTC Group alleges that the Minerts 
contacted an attorney, who contacted the FBI. See R., 000532. No evidence was presented at 
trial as to any specific comments the Minerts made to the FBI, much less any disparaging 
comments. In any event, the FBI call occurred before the Settlement Agreement was signed on 
July 11, 2014 ("IA] few days before the parties signed the settlement agreement and following a 
meeting with David Crossett, Dave Minert called his attorney Ms. Shannahan, to 'report' what 
went on at the meeting and she called the authorities which instigated a grand jury investigation 
by the U.S. Attorney's Office.") (emphasis added); Tr., 467:22-25 (conceding that "IT]he repo1t 
to the FBI took place well, before the July I01h meeting .... ") (emphasis added). 
Even if the call to the FBI had occurred after execution of the Settlement Agreement, 
Crossett acknowledged at trial that the call to the FBI was not in violation of the non-
disparagement provision or any other provision of the Settlement Agreement: 
Tr., 344:5-12. 
A. I'm not sure who called the FBI. I know it was one of them. 
Q. Do you think it's a breach of some agreement for him to call 
the FBI? 
A. Not directly. 
Q. Okay. Do you think you have -- let's assume he did call the 
FBI. Do you think you have grounds to sue him for that? 
A. No. 
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In summary, OTC Group presented no evidence of conduct on the part of Jeff Minert or 
David Minert that violated the non-disparagement provision of the Settlement Agreement. Even 
assuming that Jeff Minert and David Minert reported OTC group to the Department of Labor and 
the FRJ, none of that alleged conduct supports a jury verdict for hreach of the implied covenant 
of good faith and fair dealing, which requires a showing of conduct that violates or nullifies a 
contract. All of that alleged conduct took place before the Settlement Agreement was executed, 
and therefore cannot be a violation of the Settlement Agreement. More importantly, the 
Settlement Agreement simply does not prohibit any of the alleged conduct. Accordingly, the 
jury's verdict that Jeff and David Minert violated the covenant of good faith and fair dealing was 
not supported by substantial and competent evidence and must be set aside. 
In an oral ruling from the bench, the District Court denied a JNOV motion on OTC 
Group's implied covenant claims, reasoning as follows: 
And I think in this case the jury could infer that the Minerts and 
thereafter their company were responsible for the calls to the 
Department of Finance, the calls to the FBI, and certainly to --
there was at least one tape where a jury could have found that 
young Mr. Minert's conversation with the customer was certainly 
contrary to his stated testimony as to how he talked to customers. 
So I think what the jury -- my view is at least the jury could have 
and did come to the conclusion that the Minerts were not in good 
faith attempting to fulfill their obligations not to discharge [sic, 
disparage] under the contract, and that was the basis for their 
finding of liability. 
Tr., 817:23 - 818:17. 
The District Court's ruling demonstrates several fundamental flaws. First, the District 
Court was simply mistaken in its statement that Jeff Minert -- referred to as "the Young Mr. 
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Minert" -- was on a recorded phone call with customers in which he made disparaging 
comments. The tape recordings were of DOT Compliance sales staff (e.g., Ryan Bunnell), not 
Jeff Minert, as DTC Group has conceded. R., 000530 (" .... DTC Group had no phone 
recorrlings in which Dave Minert or Jeff Minert actually defamed DTC Group to a customer."); 
Tr., 344:13 - 345: I (Crossett conceding that he is not aware of Jeff Minert making disparaging 
comments to customers or otherwise violating the non-disparagement agreement). 
Second, the District Court incorrectly found that the jury's verdict of a violation of the 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing can be supported by evidence that Jeff Minert and David 
Minert contacted the Department of Labor and the FBI. As explained above, any such conduct 
does not violate or nullify the non-disparagement provision or any other provision in the 
Settlement Agreement, as a matter of law, because the Settlement Agreement docs not prohibit 
that conduct and because the conduct took place before the Settlement Agreement was executed. 
Finally, even if the call to the FBI had occurred after execution of the Settlement 
Agreement, a report to law enforcement cannot possibly be a violation of the implied covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing, at least where the call resulted in an official FTC Complaint for 
violations of the Sherman Act and FTC Group's stipulation to a Consent Order. Courts have 
recognized the sound "public policy intended to encourage private citizens and victims not only 
to report crime, but also to assist law enforcement with investigating and apprehending 
individuals who engage in criminal activity." Kelley v. Tanoos, 865 N.E.2d 593, 601 (Ind. 
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2007).6 Allowing the verdict to stand based on the call to the FBI would have a chilling effect 
and deter citizens from reporting criminal activity out of fear of personal liability. 
For these reasons, the District Comi erred in denying the JNOV motion on DTC Group's 
clahns for breach of the iinplied covenant of good faitl1 and fair dealing. 
C. In the Alternative, the District Court Erred in Excluding the FBI Recording 
As set forth above, the District Court erroneously concluded that the jury's implied 
covenant verdict could be supported by the allegation that, prior to executing the Settlement 
Agreement, Jeff and David Minert reported DTC Group to the FBI, which resulted in an 
investigation. In the alternative, if the call to the FBI could support a claim for breach of the 
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, the District Court erred in excluding the FBI 
recording that gave rise to the investigation. 
According to Crossett's trial testimony, Crossett and the Mine1ts met in late-June of 2014 
to discuss concerns about customer cancellations as a result of competition. Tr., 177:20 183:6. 
According to Crossett, he "made the off-hand comment that I'd been wanting to raise my prices 
for a long time." Id. at 183:21-23. However, Crossett insists that he did not propose any price-
fixing. Id. at 359:20-21. Crossett then met again with the Minerts on July 10, 2014 -- the day 
before signing the Settlement Agreement. Id. at 185:18 - 186:4. Unbeknownst to Crossett, that 
conversation was recorded at the urging of federal law enforcement officers. Id. at 485:8-25. 
6 Of course, there are remedies available for false and malicious police reports. "A private 
citizen who initiated or procured a criminal prosecution could (and can still) be sued for the 
tort of malicious prosecution-but only if he acted maliciously and without probable cause, 
and the prosecution ultimately terminated in the defendant's favor." Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 
U.S. 118, 132-33 (1997). No such circumstances exist here. 
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In describing his conversations with the Minerts, Crossett testified unequivocally that he 
did not suggest price-fixing. Id. at 186:24 189:9. In fact, Crossett testified that the Minerts 
were the ones who proposed a price-fixing scheme. Id. Crossett then asserted that DOT 
Comoliance made a frivolous reoort to the FBI in an attemnt to nut OTC Grouo out of business . 
.I. ,1 J_ 1- }_ s 
Id. at 3 59: 10-21. 
Crossett attempted to testify as to the "damages" DTC Group suffered as a result of the 
FBI investigation, including the time, resources and attorney fees it spent in the investigation. 
Id. at 191 :4 - 192: 14. However, the District Court excluded that evidence of alleged damages 
because DTC Group had not disclosed such a claim for damages in its Complaint or in 
discovery. Id.;seealsoid. at206:19 214:17. 
After Crossett testified falsely that it was the Minerts who proposed to fix prices, DOT 
Compliance subpoenaed the FBI video recording and called an FBI agent to authenticate the 
video at trial. Tr., 466:20 475:6. The purpose of introducing the FBI's video recording was to 
impeach Crossett's testimony that DOT Compliance proposed a price-fixing scheme and then 
frivolously reported DTC Group to the FBI in an attempt to put it out of business. 
The District Court did not allow DOT Compliance to call the FBI witness or play the 
video recording for the jury. Tr., 466:20 - 473:25. In excluding that evidence, the District Court 
ruled that it was "impeachment on a collateral issue." Id. at 471 :23-25. Part of the District 
Court's rationale for excluding the impeachment evidence was that DTC Group was not 
permitted to claim damages as a result of the FBI investigation. Id. at 471 :7-8 ("Well, he's not 
claiming damages for that [the report to the FBI] either"). 
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The District Court abused its discretion in excluding the FBI recording. While "a witness 
may not be impeached on an immaterial and collateral issue" (see Mundy v. Johnson, 84 Idaho 
438,451 (1962)), the July 10th recorded conversation was not immaterial or collateral. DTC 
Group opened the door hy raising the FBI call in its opening statement (Tr., 117: 16 - 112:22\ 
and then focusing on it during Crossett's direct testimony (177:20 - 179: 1; 182:22 - 183: 23; 
359:20-21) and at closing arguments (725:9-24). The effect of the District Court's ruling was 
that DTC Group was allowed to testify falsely that the Minerts proposed a price-fixing scheme 
and then frivolously reported to the FBI that DTC Group had proposed a price fixing scheme. 
However, DOT Compliance was not allowed to play for the jury the video recording of the very 
conversation out of which DOT' s claims and trial theme arose. 
The District Court's reasoning is fundamentally flawed. The District Court ruled that (1) 
DTC Group could not present evidence of damages related to the FBI investigation because 
those alleged damages had not been disclosed in discovery; and (2) the conversation that resulted 
in the FBI investigation was a "collateral issue" on which Crossett could not be impeached. 
Nevertheless, the District Comt then concluded in denying the JNOV motion that the jury's 
verdict was based on and properly supported by the call to the FBI. Tr., 817:9 - 818: 17 ("And I 
think in this case the jury could infer that the Minerts and thereafter their company were 
responsible for the calls to the Department of Finance, the calls to the FBI ... and that was the 
basis for their finding of liability"). 
There are two ways to look at this issue. If a pre-contract call to the FBI can support a 
claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, then the FBI video 
cannot be an "immaterial and collateral issue" and the District Court eITed by excluding it. If the 
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call to the FBI is an "immaterial and collateral issue" -- i.e., because it was not prohibited by the 
Settlement Agreement and occurred before execution of the Settlement Agreement, or because 
DTC Group did not disclose it as a basis for a damages claim -- then it cannot support the jury's 
verdict Either way, the jury's verdict must be set aside. 
D. In the Alternative, the Jury's Verdicts Must He Set Aside for Lack of Damages 
As set forth above, the District Court erroneously concluded that the jury's verdict 
against Jeff Minert and David Minert for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing was supported by evidence that they reported DTC Group to the FBI. Even if the 
District Court were correct, the jury's verdict must still be set aside for lack of damages. 
A violation of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing "does not result in a 
cause of action separate from the breach of contract claims, nor docs it result in separate contract 
damages unless such damages specifically relate to the breach of the good faith covenant." 
Idaho First Nat. Bank, 121 Idaho at 289. In addition to proving all other elements of an implied 
covenant claim, a plaintiff must prove damages "with reasonable certainty." Id.; R., 000316 
(instructing the jury that the plaintiff must prove "the amount of damages" caused by a breach of 
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing"). The party asserting a claim of damages 
has the burden of proving not only a right to damages but also the amount of damages." Bratton 
v. Scott, 150 Idaho 530, 537 (2011). Thus, "where a plaintiff presents no evidence to support a 
jury's damage award, the court must grant a JNOV motion in favor of the defendant." Id. 
The jury's verdict for breach of the implied covenant must be set aside because DTC 
Group presented no evidence of damages, much less damages in the amount of $20,000 each 
against Jeff Minert and David Minert. DTC Group did not present any evidence of damages 
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caused by the call to the FBI. For example, OTC Group did not claim (much less present 
evidence) that the FBI investigation cost OTC Group customers. Crossett attempted to testify as 
to the "damages" OTC Group suffered as a result of the FBI investigation, including the time, 
resources and attorney fees it spent in connection with the investigation, but the District Court 
excluded that testimony because OTC Group had not disclosed such a claim for damages in its 
Complaint or in discovery. Id. at 191 :4 - 192: 14; 206: 19 - 214: 17. The District Court confirmed 
that ruling later when it stated as part of its rationale for excluding evidence of the FBI recorded 
conversation that "he's not claiming damages for that either." Id. at 471:7-8. 
Even though the District Court precluded OTC Group from presenting damages related to 
the FBI investigation, OTC Group's counsel again emphasized the call to the FBI in her closing 
statement and referenced the District Court's order excluding damages related to that call, but 
asked the jury to consider those excluded damages in calculating damages for lost customers: 
And, remember, although -- remember I told you about there was 
these non-monetary or damages that David couldn't really 
quantify. Those things being like ... administrative time, time to 
respond to the FBI investigation, things of that nature that we're 
not going to be able to recoup because we lost that third bucket. 
But just keep in mind that those damages were there for David. 
And he endured all this at the same time that he was trying to run 
his business. 
Id. at 739:19 - 740:5. 
The jury did exactly what OTC Group asked it to do -- it awarded damages for the time 
and attorney fees spent addressing the FBI investigation, even though the District Court ruled 
that those damages are not recoverable. Accordingly, the District Court erred in denying the 
motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict based on the absence of evidence of damages 
supporting the jury verdict. 
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District Court Erred in Awarding Attorney Fees to DTC Group 
The District Court awarded DTC Group the entirety of its attorney fees incmred in 
pursuing its claims, even though DTC Group lost on the vast majority of its claims. DTC 
Group's claims for unfair competition, civil conspiracy and tortious interference with prospective 
economic advantage were dismissed prior to submitting the case to the jury. DTC Group did not 
prevail on its breach of contract claim because it did not prove any damages. R., 000329-330. 
DTC group prevailed only on its claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing against Jeff Minert and David Minert, and on its tortious interference with contract claim 
against DOT Compliance and Ryan Bunnell. R., 000331-334. 
As an initial matter, if this Court sets aside the jury's verdict, DTC Group would 
obviously not be the prevailing party. Then the District Court's attorney fee award should be 
reversed and this case should be remanded to the District Court with instructions to determine an 
appropriate cost and fee award to Appellants as the prevailing party. 
Even if this Court does not set aside the jury's verdicts, the District Court's fee award 
must still be reversed. The Settlement Agreement contains an attorney fee provision, which 
provides for a fee award to the prevailing party in an action related to an alleged breach of the 
Settlement Agreement. See Trial Exh. 500. DTC Group did not prevail on its breach of contract 
claim, however, because the jury found that it did not prove damages. See Farrar v. Hobby, 506 
U.S. 103, 112-13 (1992). The fact that the jury found a breach, but no damages, does not render 
DTC Group the prevailing party on the breach of contract claim. Id. ("To be sure, a judicial 
pronouncement that the defendant has violated the Constitution, unaccompanied by an 
enforceable judgment on the merits, does not render the plaintiff a prevailing party"). 
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The breach of contract claim is the only claim that would trigger fees to DTC Group 
under the Settlement Agreement or Idaho Code§ 12-120(3), which provides for attorney fees to 
the party that prevails on claims arising out of a commercial transaction between the parties. 
"Whether an action is based on a commercial transaction is a question of law that this Court 
exercises free review over." Sims v. Jacobson, 157 Idaho 980,342 P.3d 907, 911-12 (2015). 
"This Court has stated that Idaho Code section 12-120(3) applies when 'the commercial 
transaction comprises the gravamen of the lawsuit."' Id. "However, we have interpreted that 
rule to require courts to consider the gravamen of each claim within the lawsuit." Id. "When a 
lawsuit has multiple claims, courts look at each individual claim to determine what statutory 
basis allows attorney fees recovery on that claim." Id. "In other words, courts analyze the 
gravamen claim by claim." Id. To determine whether the gravamen of a claim is a commercial 
transaction, "the court must analyze whether a commercial transaction (I) is integral to the claim 
and (2) constitutes the basis of the party's theory of recovery on that claim." Id. 
DTC Group prevailed on its claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and 
fair dealing against Jeff Minert and David Minert. However, the verdict was not based on an 
obligation imposed by the Settlement Agreement or any other commercial transaction between 
the parties. Instead, as the District Court acknowledged, the verdict was based on the FBI call --
an act that is not governed by the Settlement Agreement and, in fact, occuITed prior to execution 
of the Settlement Agreement.7 
7 DOT Compliance acknowledges that a claim for breach of the implied covenant could have 
resulted in an attorney fee award if DTC Group had prevailed on a theory tied to the 
Settlement Agreement. DTC Group's Amended Complaint alleged that DOT Compliance 
violated the covenant of good faith and fair dealing by breaching the non-disparagement 
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The only other claim on which DTC Group prevailed was its claim for tortious 
interference with contract. That claim, however, did not arise out of any commercial transaction 
between the parties. The tortious interference claim in DTC Group's Amended Complaint 
makes no reference to the Settlement Agreement or any other commercial transaction between 
the parties. R., 000236-37. Instead, it alleges that DOT Compliance interfered with contracts 
between DTC Group and its customers. DTC Group took the position in its motion for attorney 
fees that Idaho Code§ 12-120(3) applies to the tortious interference claim because the contracts 
between DTC Group and its customers are commercial transactions. Tr., 800: 1-22. To the 
contrary, this Court has held that "[T]he action must arise from a commercial transaction 
between the parties." Syringa Networks, LLC v. Idaho Dep't qf'Admin., 155 Idaho 55, 66 
(2013). For that reason, a claim for tortious interference with another party's commercial 
transactions does not trigger a fee award. Id.; see also Thirsty's L.L.C. v. Tolerico, 143 Idaho 48, 
51 (2006) ("a prevailing party on a claim for tortious interference is not entitled to attorney fees 
under I.C. § 12-120(3)" because "lt]ortious interference with a contract is not an action to 
recover on a contract, nor a commercial transaction"). 
The District Court was required to "look at each individual claim to determine what 
statutory basis allows attorney fees recovery on that claim" and then "bifurcate the claims and 
award fees pursuant to§ 12-120(3) only on the commercial transaction." Sims, 157 Idaho 980, 
342 P.3d at 911-12. The District Court did not go through that analysis. Instead, it stated in an 
provision of the Settlement Agreement. R., 000235. However, the verdict against Jeff and 
David Minert was not based on that theory. Instead, it was based on the call to the FBI, 
which was unrelated to the Settlement Agreement and occurred prior to execution of the 
settlement agreement. 
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oral ruling from the bench, without any analysis of the individual claims, that "I don't believe 
this is an appropriate case for apportioning the fees," and awarded DTC Group the entirety of its 
attorney fees. Tr., 824:10-12. Accordingly, the attorney fee award must be set aside and 
remanded for a recalculation of attorney fees based only on claims that arose out of a commercial 
transaction. J.R. Simplot Co. v. Rycair, Inc., 138 Idaho 557, 565 (2003) (setting aside the district 
court's attorney fee award and remanding to the district court with instructions to "recalculate the 
award of fees" and "allocate the attorney fees incurred by Rycair in defending against the breach 
of contract claims but not include fees incurred in defending I the negligence claims]"). 
F. The District Court Erred in Denying DOT Compliance's Motion for Attorney Fees 
DOT Compliance prevailed on the breach of contract claim -- the only claim that arose 
out of a commercial transaction between the parties. Accordingly, the District Court erred in 
denying DOT Compliance's motion for attorney fees under Idaho Code§ 12-120(3) and the 
terms of the Settlement Agreement. Syringa Networks, 155 Idaho at 67 (when the defendant 
prevails on a claimed breach of a commercial contract, the defendant is entitled to an award of 
attorney fees). 
G. The Court Should Award Appellants Attorney Fees on Appeal 
Appellants seek an award of costs and attorney fees on appeal pursuant to Idaho Code 
§ 12-120(3), the terms of the Settlement Agreement and Idaho Appellate Rules 40 and 41. 
Although the jury's verdict for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing was 
not based on a commercial transaction, DTC Group's Amended Complaint framed the claim as a 
violation of the Settlement Agreement, a commercial transaction. R., 000235. Accordingly, if 
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the Court sets aside the jury's verdict on appeal, Appellants should be awarded their reasonable 
attorney fees on appeal. 
V. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, the jury's verdicts for tortious interference with contract 
and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing must be set aside. Upon setting 
aside the jury's verdicts, the Court should award Appellants their attorney fees on appeal 
pursuant to Idaho Code§ 12-120(3) and Idaho Appellate Rules 40 and 41 and remand to the 
District Court to determine an appropriate award of costs and attorney fees to Appellants as 
prevailing parties. Even if the Court does not set aside the jury's verdicts, it should reverse the 
District Court's attorney fee award and remand to the District Court for a recalculation of 
attorney fees based only on claims that arose out of a commercial transaction. 
DATED THIS il day of January, 2016. 
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Idaho Statutes 
TITLE 48 
MONOPOLIES AND TRADE PRACTICES 
CHAPTER 10 
IDAHO TELEPHONE SOLICITATION ACT 
4 8 1001. LEGISLATIVE FINDINGS AND INTENT. ( 1) The use of telephones 
for commercial solicitation is rapidly increasing. This form of 
communication offers unique benefits, but also entails special risks and 
the potential for abuse. Many Idaho residents and businesses have lost 
money or suffered harm primarily as a result of out-of-state telemarketing 
abuse. For the general welfare of the public and in order to protect the 
integrity of the telemarketing industry, the following provisions of law 
are deemed necessary. 
(2) It is the intent of the legislature in enacting this chapter to 
safeguard the public against deceit and financial hardship, to insure, 
foster and encourage competition and fair dealings among telephone 
solicitors by requiring adequate disclosure, and to prohibit 
representations that have the capacity, tendency, or effect of misleading 
a purchaser. The provisions of this chapter are remedial, and shall be 
construed and applied liberally to accomplish the above-stated purposes. 
( 3) This chapter shall be known and may be cited as the "Idaho 
Telephone Solicitation Act." 
History: 
[48 1001, added 1992, ch. 27, sec. 1, p. 83.) 
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Idaho Statutes 
TITLE 48 
MONOPOLIES AND TRADE PRACTICES 
CHAPTER 10 
IDAHO TELEPHONE SOLICITATION ACT 
48-1003. UNLAWFUL ACTS. (1) It is an unlawful act for a telephone 
solicitor to: 
(a) Intimidate or torment any person of normal and reasonable 
sensitivities in connection with a telephone solicitation; 
(b) Refuse to hang up and free the purchaser's line immediately once 
requested to do so by the purchaser; 
(c) Misrepresent the price, quality, or availability of the goods or 
services being offered to the purchaser, or not to disclose all 
material matters relating directly or indirectly to the offered goods 
or services; 
(d) Advertise, represent, or imply that the person has the approval 
or endorsement of any government, governmental office, or agency, 
unless such is the fact; 
(e) Advertise, represent, or imply that the person has a valid 
registration number when the person does not; 
( f) Utilize any device or method to block or mislead the intended 
recipient of the call as to the identity of the solicitor, or the 
trade name of the person being represented by the solicitor on a 
caller identification telecommunication device; 
(g) Fail to comply with the provisions of section 48-603A, Idaho 
Code; 
(h) Violate any applicable provision or requirement of this chapter; 
and 
(i) Send an unsolicited advertisement to a telephone facsimile 
machine. 
(2) Any violation of the provisions of this chapter is an unlawful, 
unfair, and deceptive act or practice in trade or commerce for the purpose 
of applying the Idaho consumer protection act, ch er 6 title 48 Idaho 
Code. 
History: 
[48-1003, added 1992, ch. 27, sec. 1, p. 85; am. 1997, ch. 224, sec. 
1 , p . 6 6 0 ; am. 1 9 9 9 , ch . 4 6 , sec . 1 , p . 10 8 . ] 
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Idaho Statutes 
TITLE 48 
MONOPOLIES AND TRADE PRACTICES 
CHAPTER 10 
IDAHO TELEPHONE SOLICITATION ACT 
48 1004. TELEPHONE SOLICITOR DUTIES. (1) Telephone solicitors shall: 
(a) Register with the attorney general at least ten (10) days prior 
to conducting business in Idaho. All registrations shall be valid for 
a period of one (1) year from the effective date of the registration. 
Any information reported in the application which has changed during 
the year shall be reported within two (2) weeks of such change to the 
attorney general and shall be included in an amended registration form 
filed at the time the telephone solicitor renews his registration. 
Registrations may be renewed annually by applying to the attorney 
general and paying a registration renewal fee; 
(b) File with the attorney general an irrevocable consent appointing 
the attorney general as an agent to receive civil process in any 
action, suit, or proceeding brought under this chapter; 
(c) Provide his registration number to any purchaser who requests the 
registration number; 
(d) Orally inform the purchaser at the time the purchase is completed 
of his right to cancel as provided in subsection 48 1004 (2), Idaho 
Code, and state the telephone solicitor's registration number issued 
by the attorney general; 
( e) Provide accurate and complete information when making a 
registration application and possess and maintain a valid registration 
as required in this chapter; and 
(f) Give the full street address, including the telephone number, of 
the telephone solicitor if a sale or purchase is completed. 
(2) Unless the purchaser has an unqualified right to return the goods 
or cancel the services and receive a full refund, the telephone solicitor 
shall send a written confirmation to the purchaser, which shall contain 
the following statement in ten (10) point bold face type, which sets forth 
a purchaser's right to cancel any agreement made pursuant to a telephone 
solicitation under this section: 
NOTICE OF CANCELLATION 
You may cancel this transaction, without any penalty or 
obligation whatsoever, within three business days of the date in 
which you receive this written confirmation. 
If you cancel, all payments or other consideration which may 
have already been made by you will be returned within ten business 
days following receipt by the telephone solicitor of your 
cancellation notice. 
If you cancel, you must return the goods to the telephone 
solicitor at the address listed below and at the telephone 
solicitor's risk and expense within twenty-one days of the date 
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His 
you receive back from the telephone solicitor the payments or 
consideration you have already made. 
To cancel this transaction, deposit in the mail or deliver a 
signed and dated copy of this cancellation notice or any other 
written notice to ..... (Name of telephone solicitor) ..... , 
at ss of sel er' s ace of business) ..... not later 
than of the third business day after which you received 
this notice. 
I hereby cancel this transaction. 
(Date) 
(Buyer's signature) 
[48 1004, added 1992, ch. 27, sec. 1, p. 85.J 
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Idaho Statutes 
TITLE 48 
MONOPOLIES AND TRADE PRACTICES 
CHAPTER 10 
IDAHO TELEPHONE SOLICITATION ACT 
48-1007. PRIVATE CAUSES OF ACTION AND REMEDIES. (1) person who 
purchases goods or services pursuant to a telephone solicitation and 
thereby suffers damages as a result of any act, conduct, or practice 
declared unlawful in this chapter shall have the same rights and remedies 
in seeking and obtaining redress under this chapter as those granted under 
the Idaho consumer protection act, 6 t tle Idaho Code. 
(2) If a telephone solicitor icable provision of 
this chapter, any contract of sale or is null and void and 
unenforceable. 
( 3) If a telephone solicitor fails to deliver the goods or services 
contracted for, pursuant to the federal trade cornmi ssion' s "mail order 
merchandise rule," 16 CFR 435, the contract to purchase is null and void. 
(4) Any contract, agreement to purchase, or written confirmation 
executed by a purchaser which purports to waive any of the purchaser's 
rights under this chapter is against public policy and shall be null and 
void and unenforceable. 
(5) The remedies provided for in this chapter are not exclusive, and 
shall be in addition to any other procedures or remedies for any violation 
or conduct provided for in any other law. 
History: 
[48-1007, added 1992, ch. 27, sec. 1, p. 88.] 
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